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“WHERE BUTCHERS SING LIKE ANGELS”
Of Captive Bodies and Colonized Minds  
(With a Little Help from Louise Erdrich)
The most insidious oppressions are those that so insinuate them-
selves into the fabric of our lives and into the recess of our minds 
that we don’t even realize they are acting upon us. 
(Michael Parenti) 
prolegomena
Since 1984, the publication year of her debut novel Love Medicine, 
Louise Erdrich, an American author of German and Chippewa origin, 
has been constructing a cycle of interconnected narratives that 
converge on a North Dakota reservation and the nearby towns, 
such as Argus. Readers of The Master Butchers Signing Club (2003) 
are introduced to Argus in the second decade of the 20th century, 
when it is rapidly expanding thanks to the newly constructed 
railroad connecting it to the rest of the country. As a town built 
on unceded aboriginal lands, Argus is symbolic of the white 
man’s victorious war against America’s indigenous inhabitants, 
whose tragic fate is epitomized by the ragpicker Step-and-a-Half, 
a deeply traumatized survivor of the Wounded Knee Massacre. 
On the other hand, the town’s two thriving butcher shops are 
telling reminders of the original colonizing project—that of human 
mastery over animals.
Alien to the hunting cultures of North America’s indigenous 
inhabitants—Step-and-a-Half’s ancestors—the domestication 
and exploitation of large social animals for food and as a workforce 
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scale violence against and injury to devalued humans, particularly 
indigenous people around the world.” In the final analysis, rather 
than being the much touted leap in the development of humanity, 
domestication—more aptly called domesacration—“undermined 
the development of a just and peaceful world” (Nibert 2). In this 
article, I will draw on methodologies provided by decolonial thinking 
and Critical Animal Studies to argue that violence against animals 
and violence against devalued/animalized humans are two sides 
of the same coin.
Sociologist Lucy Mayblin succinctly defines the main thrust 
of decolonial thinking in the following way: “decolonialists seek 
to draw attention to the relation between colonialism and the nar-
rative of modernity, through which much of the world’s history 
has come to be understood. Modernity, then, is viewed as an epis-
temological frame that is inseparably bound to the European 
colonial project” (Mayblin). My article is guided by the same 
ambition. With the help of Louise Erdrich, a U.S. author of mixed 
Euro-Cherokee descent, I aim to contest the accepted reading 
of the modern narrative of progress and foreground the trope 
of war against the animal(ized) Other I identify in her novel. Being 
partly indigenous and partly white, Erdrich transfers her divided 
loyalties onto the written page, revealing fundamental fault lines 
in modernity’s masternarrative. Reading closely carefully chosen 
fragments of Master Butchers Singing Club, I follow the associative 
paths suggested by the words and images used by the author. 
Not arguing explicitly against modernity, Erdrich nevertheless 
manages to capture much of its “dark side.” My article will try 
to bring this repressed, invisiblized part of the modern narrative 
into light. 
I wish to stress that my article is not a systematic analysis 
of Erdrich’s novel. On the contrary, I wish to use the text as an illus-
tration of the larger thesis, namely, that the ongoing war against 
the nonhuman and the not-quite-human cannot be properly 
understood without critiquing the idea of human exceptional-
ism, a concept unknown to Paleolithic-style small-scale societies, 
whose members realized they were constituted by their rela-
tions with other, nonhuman selves. For them, preserving those 
























on the other hand, constituted in the act of separating himself 
from nature, is a schizophrenic figure, bent on killing the nonhu-
man Other that in fact, co-constitutes him.1 Although capable 
of utter selflessness and the most astonishing works of beauty, 
he is not an angel, as evidenced by the long list of modern atroci-
ties committed in the name of white privilege. In the course of my 
analysis, I will draw on Master Butchers Singing Club to illustrate 
the schizophrenia of modern life: trying to live the good life 
as advanced by Western culture, we2 perform acts of atrocious 
violence against the animal(ized) Other, often without realizing 
it. Socialization into the structures of oppression makes us blind 
to the violence inherent in our lives. Only a vision from the margin, 
similar to that granted to Erdrich’s Delphine, can reveal what has 
been occluded by the notions of progress and prosperity. Positing 
that everybody has been colonized in mind and body in the course 
of history,3 I will conclude by suggesting the need for decolonizing 
our relations with all living beings. I want to argue that we will 
never be fully human unless we recover a sense of embeddedness 
in a web of relations that co-constitute us (Sepie). By allowing 
an indigenous author to have the last word in this article, I wish 
to honor the wisdom of traditional worldviews which are not my 
own and to which, therefore, I have no rightful claim. 
the violence of humanism 
David Nibert is part of a growing number of scholars who 
believe that the anthropological machine (Agamben 33–38)—that is, 
the philosophical and scientific production of human life as distinct 
from the life of animals—is at the root of all modern oppressions. 
1. The spelling of hu/man—with a slash—is to draw attention to the fact 
that modern humanity has been defined in explicitly masculine, patriarchal 
terms. Within this article, I shall be using ‘white privilege’ and ‘normative 
humanity’ as synonyms terms. 
2. Erdrich is of indigenous and European descent and often speaks simul-
taneously from the two epistemologies she has inherited. Thus, the ‘we 
moderns’ would also, at least partly, include her. As for myself, being 
a white European woman, I realize I am part of the ‘we’ too, having been 
co-constituted by the same cultural codes I am trying to contest. 
3. Although I have been reaching similar conclusions in my previous research, 























Legal scholar Tarik Kochi of the University of Sussex, for example, 
demonstrates how decisions about what constitutes ‘legitimate’ 
violence are influenced by our assumptions about the value of life. 
The bare life—especially if it threatens the ‘good life’ as defined 
by Western modernity—is believed to be justifiably eliminable. 
War is a legitimate form of violence against life construed as zoe, 
or bare, which is commonly associated with purely utilitarian value. 
Livestock would be a prime example of the bare life—bred for con-
sumption, they are denied any intrinsic worth and have almost 
no (executable) legal rights. According to Kochi, therefore, “what 
sits at the foundation of the Law of war is a discourse of species 
war that over time has been so naturalized within Western legal 
and political theory that we have almost forgotten about it.” 
Admitting that “species war may not be a Western monopoly,” 
the scholar nevertheless soberly accepts the West’s responsibil-
ity for imposing its own specific form of species war on the rest 
of the world through the interconnected processes of colonization 
and globalization (356). “For most humans in the West,” adds Kochi, 
“the ‘good life’ involves the daily killing of animals for dietary need 
and for pleasure” (362). Another legal scholar, Maneesha Deckha 
from the University of Victoria, draws the inescapable conclu-
sion suggested but not explicitly articulated by Kochi. Finding 
the subhuman to be “the cultural agent of violence,” she concludes 
that humanism is synonymous with violence. Grounded as it 
is in oppositional thinking, humanism will always work through 
the logic of exclusion, the subhuman and non-human situated 
as the ‘legitimate’ recipient of violence. 
Australian scholar Dinesh Wadiwel is another crucial contributor 
to the discussion of species war. Although I am in no way capable 
of doing justice to his profound book The War Against Animals 
in the space available, it is important to note that the author 
explicitly uses the trope of war to theorize human-animal rela-
tions. Having established his sovereignty over animals, man treats 
them as spoils of war to secure “the continual excess of human 
























whose intrinsic worth is constructed as negligible, are to enhance 
the quality of human life—the only life worth consideration. 
Yet, how do we move beyond oppositional politics inherent 
in the discourses of humanism? How do we end species war 
in a way that would not replicate exclusionary thinking or ensure 
the perpetration of violence meted out in the name of the good life 
of the normative human? Decolonial critics point to the necessity 
of de-linking from the categories of thought imposed by colonial-
ism and globalization and the subsequent retrieval of ancestral 
wisdoms for ‘thinking otherwise.’ To think human-animal relations 
otherwise, in ways repressed by the paradigm of human domin-
ionism, we need to think disobediently. “Epistemic disobedience,” 
argues Walter Mignolo, “is necessary to take on civil disobedience 
to its point of non-return” (“Epistemic Disobedience” 17).
 Another philosopher of decoloniality, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, 
in his book Against War aptly subtitled Views from the Underside 
of Modernity, finds violence and war to be more then “contingent 
results of particular historical projects. “For victims of colonialism 
violence and war appear as “constitutive dimensions of dominant 
conceptions of civilization and civilizational progress” (5). Under-
neath the triumphalist rhetoric of progress hides modernity’s dark 
unconscious, the repository of the repressed crimes of colonial-
ity which made modernity possible. In accordance with the logic 
of Freudian psychoanalysis, this dark side of modernity continues 
to inform our daily choices and thus locks us in the prison house 
of compulsive repetitions of the past. Unless, that is, we dare 
to question the worldview available from the “zero point” of West-
ern man’s epistemic privilege (Castro-Gomez, qtd. in Grosfoguel). 
Questioning the assumptions we moderns live by implies 
choosing to position ourselves on the underside of modernity, 
together with the human and non-human victims of manifold 
oppressions invisibilized by the progressive paradigm of moder-
nity. A view from the margin is certain to subvert our comforts 
and little securities, but then again, liberation from mental cap-
tivity is meant to be a revolutionary event, requiring a corollary 
revolutionary change in lifestyle. While a negative peace is simply 























violence, positive peace—the presence of justice—resolves tensions 
and abolishes hierarchical distinctions.
delphine: a view from the margin 
Delphine Watzka, the main female protagonist of The Master 
Butchers Singing Club, is of uncertain origin. She believes that her 
father is a local drunkard of Polish descent, and that her mother, 
supposedly a Native American, died soon after Delphine was born. 
All this turns out to be untrue. At the novel’s end, the readers learn 
(but Delphine never does) that her biological mother, a pathological 
Mrs. Shimek, discarded her as a newborn infant into an outhouse 
and that the Wounded Knee survivor, Step-and-a Half, rescued 
the girl and brought her to Roy Watzka’s house. As a poor woman, 
supposedly of native descent, struggling for her and her father’s 
survival and performing as a circus artist with a gay partner 
with Ojibwe roots, Delphine is multiply marginalized within 
the patriarchal, assimilationist society of the first half of the 20th 
century. By marrying the local butcher, Fidelis Waldvogel, she leaves 
the margin and joins the local elite. From that moment on, Delphine 
too can participate in the good life advertised as available to all 
hard-working, conscientious Americans, regardless of their origins. 
As both substitute mother to four young men who fight 
on both sides of the Second World War and her husband’s partner 
in the butchering business, Delphine is no innocent bystander 
to modernity’s wars. Yet, it is she who, at the novel’s close, 
is granted a vision from the underside of modernity. In a par-
ticularly lucid moment, she sees beyond the socially constructed 
ideas and normativities of the Western world. The vision of naked 
reality is a vision of the world at war. At the unveiling of a monu-
ment to the victims of the bombing of Ludwigsruhe, Fidelis’s 
hometown, a choir of master butchers performs in the open. 
Bewildered by the strange culture and alienated among her hus-
band’s German relatives, Delphine experiences a moment of acute 
derealization. Looking at the festive celebrations, she is reminded 
of the atrocities that had taken place there a short while before—
“the burning, the marching, an enormity beyond her, a terrible 
strangeness in which things unbelievable were done” (375). But now 
























are elegant, cheerful, carefree. For some reason, she sees a photo 
of the young Step-and-a-Half blur with the scene in front of her. 
Delphine no longer hears the singing; she only sees “the mouths 
of the men opening and shutting in unison, in a roar, like some 
collection of animals in a zoo” (375). The scene continues:
She saw what was really happening. As the veil was torn away, as the sta-
tue of the burned stood washed in pleasant sunlight, as the master 
butchers parted their lips in song, smoke and ash poured out of their 
mouth holes like chimneys. Their hearts were smoldering, she thou-
ght disoriented. Their guts were on fire. Their lungs were hot bellows. 
Yet they kept on singing as though nothing was wrong at all. Nobody 
pointed, no children cried. Darkness continued to spiral out of the men’s 
oven-box chests. Smoke swirled, ash drifted. Finally the singing ended. 
All the cloudy dark the men had belched disintegrated and was gone, 
except for the tarry residues of the shadows. People surrounding her 
smiled and nodded. Clapped their hands with a solid racking clatter that 
went on and on. So, thought Delphine, very tired, throwing her hands 
together along with everyone else, it was normal for black plumes to rise 
from the mouths of the singing butchers into the brilliant air of the gar-
den. It was an ordinary thing to witness here. (375–76)
The light and the shadow, the glittering surface and the atrocities 
buried underneath—the latter invisible yet constitutive of the proj-
ect of modernity—this is Western culture’s schizophrenia laid bare 
in Delphine’s vision. She sees both sides of the modern/colonial coin. 
A nation that produced some of the (Western) world’s greatest 
poets, philosophers, and musicians produced also the Übermensch, 
the Superhuman, the Führer—a semi-divine figure existing outside 
of the rule of law; creator of the modern death camp for those 
who failed to meet the criteria for inclusion in the race of masters. 
By superimposing Step-and-a-Half’s photo on the surrealist picture 
of the smoke-belching German butchers singing in a beautiful 
harmony of voices, Erdrich identifies the violence of colonialism 
with the beginning of the modern paradigm of war (against 
the subhuman). In Erdrich’s historical intervention, the Wounded 
Knee Massacre anticipates the Final Solution.
On December 29, 1890, about 300 peaceful Lakota men, 
women, and children were massacred at a camp the U.S. cav-
alrymen had ordered them to set up the previous day. Instead 
of the protection promised by the U.S. army, the weary Indians 























scholar John Carlos Rowe has this to say about the role Wounded 
Knee plays in The Master Butchers Singing Club: “Like a ghostly 
return of the repressed in Freudian psychoanalysis, Wounded 
Knee surfaces several times in Erdrich’s novel as the unconscious 
of Argus, North Dakota, and by extension the entire modernization 
process of the United States” (169). Normalized and repressed 
to the shadowy region of the cultural unconscious, genocidal 
violence is the unacknowledged price for the good life Western 
style, violence being “an ordinary thing to witness here” (376).
Despite her insight into the heart of modern darkness, Delphine 
applauds the master butchers’ problematic performance “with 
everyone else.” Rather than delink from the violence produced 
by normative humanity, she passively accepts her participation in its 
privileges, because she is concerned with assimilation. Delphine 
is a figure of reconciliation and care in the novel. This is why she helps 
to run the butcher shop and passively watches Fidelis shoot the feral 
dogs whom he had previously fed. A victim of the colonial matrix 
of power herself, Delphine, whose very name suggests affinities 
with animals, has been socialized to participate in the structural 
oppression of devalued bodies, to oppress and exploit other dam-
nés. Although she secretly sympathizes with the dogs, hoping 
some will have escaped Fidelis’s rifle, she is not ready to renounce 
the privileges of her social standing. As a middle-class, decent 
woman with a liberal conscience, Delphine represses the animal 
Other, happy to be included in the elite category of the human. 
Her solidarity with victims of systemic oppressions outside of her 
family rarely goes beyond charity. 
To speak from the margin is to speak in resistance, wrote bell 
hooks. Only if consciously embraced, however, can the margin 
become a site of struggle, a site “where transformation is pos-
sible” (hooks 203). Hooks asks: “Within complex and ever shifting 
realms of power relations, do we position ourselves on the side 
of colonizing mentality? Or do we continue to stand in political 
resistance with the oppressed?” (203, emphasis added). 
fidelis: the normative human 
Newly arrived in the USA, Fidelis Waldvogel, a German immi-
























of identity and cultural assimilation—a master theme of Erdrich’s 
novels. But by settling in Argus, he is also, albeit involuntarily, 
participating in the ongoing dispossession of native peoples 
from their ancestral lands and the marginalization of their traditional 
lifeways. Fidelis is an admirable character of great moral probity, 
an emblematic modern man: hard-working, persevering, self-made. 
He is a faithful and protective husband, a loving father, and a man 
of honor. Yet, to be all of the above, he has to cultivate manifold 
epistemologies of ignorance4 to keep at a safe distance the spec-
ter of coloniality’s dark side. Not an innocent bystander to direct 
violence against the Other, Fidelis is modern man par excellence, 
suppressing doubts of moral nature as prerequisite for achieving 
the required stance of detached, professional mastery. 
As a sniper in the Great War, Fidelis was among the most feared 
soldiers on the battlefield. Although specially trained marksmen 
had been used in earlier conflicts, German snipers made history 
as the first ever to use rifles with telescopic sights, which allowed 
them to shoot with incredible precision. Moreover, in contrast 
to British marksmen,
German snipers did not normally work from their own trenches. The main 
strategy was to creep out at dawn into no-man’s land and remain there 
all day. Wearing camouflaged clothing and using the cover of a fake 
tree, they waited for a British soldier to pop his head above the parapet.” 
(“Snipers”)
The combination of exceptional skills, expert training, and the ability 
to operate independently of other soldiers gave German snipers 
a fearsome reputation. They were masters of the craft of war. 
The sniper’s precision killing approximated high modernist art. 
Not without reason did high modernist art, which arguably origi-
nated with the Lost Generation’s wartime experience, highlight 
the importance of impersonality, technical discipline, precision 
of execution and total control over the medium of representation. 
4. Epistemologies of ignorance are forms of unlearning; the complex 
phenomena of knowledge practices that produce and sustain various forms 
of ignorance. For the purpose of this article I am limiting myself to those 
“that take the form of the center’s own ignorance of injustice, cruelty, and suf-























Mainstream Euro-American modernism often celebrated violence 
and revealed misogynist, anti-Semitic, homophobic, dominationist 
biases. Ezra Pound idolized Mussolini; Hemingway saw the incarna-
tion of the artist in the figure of the bullfighter. I posit that Fidelis 
is another quintessential artist of the modernist period. 
Endowed with an angelic voice and passionate about poetry, 
he was forced to “shut down” (Erdrich 2) his senses and do vio-
lence to his sensitive nature in the trenches of World War One. 
Motivated by the need to survive, he became a deadly sniper, 
“deal[ing] death accurately from his sandbagged and reinforced 
turret” (5). The mechanical, repetitive nature of this process 
deadened his consciousness and allowed him to “meticulously oil 
[…] and clean […] the workings of his rifle” in between shootings, 
and continue, day in and day out, “with a raptor’s perseverant 
ease to pluck men from that too shallow rift in the earth” (5). 
His craft is totally impersonal, divorced from emotions, seem-
ingly effortless, although the appearance of “perseverant ease” 
results from rigorous discipline and self-control. Fidelis’s technical 
mastery is a death warrant to the eliminable Other on the oppo-
site side of the battlefront. His art is conscienceless. As aptly 
noticed by Thomas Austenfeld, “[t]he savage butchery of war 
and the precision butchering of animals, a master craft of long 
standing, are but two sides of the same coin” (8).
In the Waldvogel family, the arcane skills of butchering have 
been passed down from father to son for generations. The Wald-
vogels were not ordinary butchers; they were Metzgemeisters, 
master butchers: 
[…] there was an art to a proper killing. The profession, acquired only 
through painstaking study and examination form a young age, was one 
of extraordinary precision and timing. The Metzgemeister’s diploma 
required working knowledge of  every spice known to  humankind, 
the arcane preparation of hundreds of varieties of wurst, and the abi-
lity to commit one’s knife edge to the animal’s created bulk and grain 
with dreamlike intuition. His father, having practiced all his life, hardly 
seemed to move his hands as the animal fell into increasingly civilized 
























liness disappeared and it entered, as Fidelis saw it, a higher and more 
satisfactory form of being. (8–9)
As demonstrated by the age of genocide,5 evil is banal rather 
than Faustian. It is the law-abiding citizen, the most trustful 
and trustworthy person (fides means trust, faith) who, having 
silenced his conscience, becomes a master butcher (of human 
and non-human animals) totally dedicated to his craft. Only when 
handling the Other with the indifferent precision of a superior 
being and with faith (fides) in either his military superiors’ orders 
or man’s divinely-ordained right to domination over the animal, 
will the modern man be able to treat the vilified Other as, respec-
tively, the eliminable enemy and material to shape according to his 
(the master’s) superior vision.
Like his father before him, Fidelis has perfected the skill 
to “improve” livestock by bringing them from the abyss of chaotic 
and unpredictable “creatureliness” to a more orderly and superior 
state, in which all randomness and waste has been eliminated. 
This is the Western man’s most sublime art: the arcane and highly 
disciplined project of subduing ungovernable matter, making 
nature profitable, and civilizing it (along with all those who are 
on the ‘nature’ side of modern dichotomies). It is safe to argue that, 
as both sniper and butcher, Fidelis embodies the carnophallogo-
centric6 privileges of Western subjectivity. Meat-eating and killing 
animals/animalized Others are acts whose aim is, according to Carol 
Adams, “a sort of desperate performative rebuilding of the car-
nopallogocentric subject through violence” (36). 
In the American context, Fidelis’s profession provides another 
link between human domination over nature and the violence 
of colonialism. Both projects are directed at the same goal: 
5. See, e.g., Samantha Powell, A Problem from Hell: America and the Age 
of Genocide (Basic Books, 2002).
6. Jacques Derrida introduced the idea of carnophallogocentism in his late 
essay “Eating Well.” According to the philosopher, Western subjectivity 
is quintessentially virile and masculine (phallo), speaking and self-present 























the securing of a continual flow of the spoils of war for the enjoy-
ment of the normative hu/man. 
To wit, the violent subjugation and forced dispossession of North 
America’s indigenous people from their tribal territories, as well 
as the clearing of the Great Plains of the free roaming buffalo, allowed 
for the creation of lucrative ranching empires where “domesacrated” 
animals were raised for profit. Although the notorious Union 
Stock Yards of Chicago are never mentioned in the Erdrich novel, 
by the time of Fidelis’s arrival in Argus they were already employing 
40,000 workers (“The Union Stockyards”). Chicagoan Carl Sandburg 
called the city “Hog Butcher for the World” (191). Soon the boom-
ing animal-industrial complex was to drive small slaughterhouses 
(like Fidelis’s) out of business. Upton Sinclair’s novel The Jungle, 
depicting animal suffering and immigrant workforce oppression 
in the Stock Yards, was published in 1914. By then, the meat industry 
had already established a heavy meat diet as the marker of social 
standing. For countless immigrants, especially from poverty-stricken 
regions of Europe, successful assimilation to American culture 
meant the adoption of meat as their staple diet. Charles Patterson 
asserts that meat was for them “a rite of passage into the coveted 
American middle class” (58). 
Violence and meat-eating are two sides of the same coin, 
asserts Carol Adams in an interview with Matthew Calarco; 
the self-present, speaking, rational, masculine, and flesh-eating 
human is the essential human who, like Fidelis, kills “with a rap-
tor’s perseverant ease” (Erdrich 5). 
The raptor is Erdrich’s insightful metaphor for humanity, under-
stood, in the words of decolonial philosopher Syl Ko, as “not just 
homo sapiens but an ideal type of homo sapiens” (73). In her essay 
“Notes from the Border of the Human-Animal Divide,” Ko argues that 
all inferiorized Others, human and nonhuman alike, are the Fanonian 
damnés—the wretched of the earth—but they are also “kindred 
spirits in a fight to depose ‘the human’” (73). Knowing that “only 
humans are taken seriously” (74) while those marked by their ‘less 
than’ status are routinely silenced and invisibilized, Ko advocates 
a rebellious move, one that runs counter to the much celebrated 
























category of ‘the human.’ I quote Syl Ko’s appeal at some length 
to illustrate the stakes involved:
Let’s use our exclusion and invisibility as a power […]. Let’s use our era-
sure from this rotten-to-the-core Western notion of humanity to build 
up a different “new world,” one that is not defined in terms of dicho-
tomies or  hierarchies or  emotional death—but centered on  love: one 
in which we accept ambiguity and difference, grounded in an expan-
sive, limitless “we” […]. We are realizing that by existing in this strange, 
liminal space, the  space of  being not-quite-human, we are forced 
to reconceive and reject the standard articulation of what speciesism 
is and how to fight it. In recognizing our strange status explicitly in terms 
of the grand division that makes all “isms” possible, the human-animal 
dichotomy, we voluntarily align ourselves with our fellow beings, those 
who do not belong to homo sapiens, in solidarity as we all somehow conti-
nue to thrive despite the crushing weight of the figure “the human.” (75) 
Delphine failed to align herself with the victims of ‘the human.’ 
By choosing inclusion in the oppressive category, she compromised 
her potential to build the world of the You; she failed to act on her 
extraordinary vision. Syl Ko’s words echo bell hooks’s realization 
that the margin has to be freely chosen if it is to become the site 
of resistance. 
A growing number of activists from racial and oppressed 
minorities are reaching a similar conclusion, the chief target of their 
criticism being the Eurocentric, normative idea of the human. Criti-
cal of Western modernity, with its humanist, liberal discourses, 
they attempt to decenter whiteness and its supremacist uni-
versum by postulating the concept of pluriversality. As defined 
by Walter Mignolo, pluriversality is the “entanglement of several 
cosmologies connected today in a power differential. That power 
differential is the logic of coloniality covered up by the rhe-
torical narrative of modernity. Modernity is a fiction that carries 
in it the seed of Western pretense to universality” (“On Pluri-
versality”). To think pluritopically, though, one needs to dwell 
in the border, in the entanglement, rather than merely “study” 
it from the outside. To dwell in the border—or, in hook’s terms, 
in the margin—means choosing it over and against the comforts 
and securities of the assimilationist center. Decolonial critics point 
to the necessity of delinking from the compromised epistemologies 























is an attempt to look at human-animal relationships differently 
by challenging the modernist matrix of domination. 
of pigs and men: towards the dismantling of the species barrier
Typically, in the racist/speciesist matrix of modernity, the pig, 
seen as the essence of filth and unruly behavior, has been used 
to animalize the most ‘uncivilized’ Other that needs to be disci-
plined or disposed of altogether. Within Erdrich’s novel, Fidelis’s 
sister, simply called Tante—a prim xenophobe, German nationalist, 
and supporter of Hitler’s racist theories—must have used the ‘Jew-
ish pig’ slogan, which paved the way for the Final Solution. As it 
turns out, however, the use of pigs for othering was not motivated 
solely by cultural prejudice or religious taboo. Originally, as argued 
by Karl Steel in his book How to Make a Human: Animals and Vio-
lence in the Middle Ages (2011), pigs were perceived as dangerously 
similar to humans, therefore threatening to the concept of human 
exceptionality. The abjection of pigs served the purpose of dis-
tinguishing ‘ourselves’ (humans) from ‘them’ (animals)—who, 
as demonstrated by the liminal pigs, were in fact disturbingly 
like ‘us.’ “Animal-like and human-like,” writes Steel, “reviled for its 
appetite but useless without it, permitted to live only to be killed, 
but at the same time also fundamentally ungovernable, even 
murderous,” pigs resisted dichotomization. Steel continues: 
By killing and eating other animals, pigs lay claim to, even if only tem-
porarily and  without any  institutional support, the  dominion within 
human zones of control that only humans should possess […]. In their 
violence, pigs behaviorally manifest a resemblance always present sim-
ply because of the anatomical likeness between humans and pigs. (184)
As sniper and master butcher, Fidelis sanctions the cordon sani-
taire between the rational, ‘civilized’ masters and the subhuman 
and nonhuman brutes—the literal and metaphorical pigs. Fidelis’s 
Metzgemeister’s diploma is eerily evocative of the supremacist 
ideology of the master race, which found its consummation 
in the Jewish Holocaust on the one hand, and the biopolitics 
of animal agriculture on the other.7 The ideology of the master race 
7. For a concise treatment of this theme, see especially “Master Species, 
























is racist and speciesist at the same time. In both cases, the ‘less 
than’ human is ultimately devoid of agency, locked in a death camp 
(the industrial farm for animals) or enslaved in many other ways. 
To dismantle the interconnected zones of the human-animal 
“gulag archipelago” (Wadiwel 24), we need to start from dismantling 
human sovereignty. As argued by Wadiwel, sovereignty is always 
declared retroactively, as rationalization or justification of a vic-
tory over the Other, whether human or non-human. Sovereignty 
“is the declaration of non reciprocity; the refusal of alterity through 
non recognition” (258). In decolonial readings of Hegel’s mater-
slave dynamic, the colonial master does not need recognition 
from the subalter(n)/damné. As demonstrated by Frantz Fanon, 
the only way for the damné to gain recognition and liberation 
is through struggle, because only struggle gives the subaltern 
agency and asserts his/her dignity. In The War Against Animals, 
Wadiwel posits that animal sovereignty can be understood 
as “a mode of resistance against human domination” (253). This 
interpretation is confirmed by ethologists like Evelyn Lawino Abe, 
or Gay Bradshaw, author of Elephants on the Edge: What Animals 
Teach Us About Humanity (2009) and founder of trans-species 
psychology.8 Erdrich’s Master Butchers offers an example of such 
a reversal of sovereignty and agency in a scene with a pedigree pig 
literally rebelling against being slaughtered. By resorting to vio-
lence against the butcher, she challenges the perception that farm 
animals are ‘mere’ provisions, thus revealing the unnaturalness 
of the speciesist barrier. 
The intelligent price sow is about to be “decreate[d] […] into 
rib chops, tenderloin, hams, hocks, pickled feet, fatback, bacon, 
and sausages” (Erdrich 36). She senses the danger and resists being 
driven up the chute: she “stood her ground,” then charged and bit 
into Fidelis’s knee cap, “shredding [his] trousers and skin to the bone” 
(37). With the second charge, the pig destroyed “what was left 
of his knee with another lurching bite. She then repaired to her 
corner, red-eyed, bleary with hatred, sobbing” (37). From the space 
8. Sarat Cooling provides a useful list of scholars who write about animal 
resistance (“Animal Agency, Resistance and Escape” in Critical Animal 
Studies: Towards Trans-species Social Justice, edited by Atsuko Matsuoka 























of ethical suspension to which she has been relegated by Fidelis-
the archetypal modern hu/man, Erdrich’s militant sow asserts 
agency by struggling against the oppressor, rather than passively 
wait to be killed. She challenges the idea of human supremacy 
naturalized by species war. The uneven battle between Fidelis 
(armed and abetted by his son) and the (unarmed) sow cannot 
end otherwise than in the animal’s defeat. Had they confronted 
each other on equal terms, however, the result could have been 
diametrically different. 
Despite his victory, Fidelis’s world has been shattered 
by an unwanted intimation of kinship with the slaughtered animal. 
He is overwhelmed by grief and an irrational desire to lie down 
in mud and cry—“and was all the more horrified to realize that 
he wept for the sow. How could that be?” Fidelis is bewildered: 
“He had killed people. He had seen them die. His best friend had 
died beside him. No tears. What sort of man was he to weep, now, 
for a pig?” (38). Furious with himself for this ‘unmanly’ weakness, 
he forces himself to ignore his wound and oversees the smallest 
details of processing the meat. As if his powerful will could bend 
reality, annul the unwelcome revelation, and return him to the safety 
of tested truths. Denying his own animality, he denies the real-
ity of the body and its senses. Fidelis—the modern human—lives 
in denial, a denial that originates with his formative wartime 
experience, this symbolic rite of passage to modern manhood 
for members of his generation.
Having returned from the Great War with an undiagnosed 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Fidelis realized he must keep 
his senses shut. “Memories would creep up on him,” he thought 
to himself, “emotions sabotage his thinking brain. To come alive 
after dying to himself was dangerous. There was far too much 
to feel, so he must seek, he thought, only shallow sensations” (2). 
Significantly, his protective cover is pierced twice and both times 
he is caught unawares by emotions too primal to be kept in check 
by the supposedly rational, autonomous self. Weeping for the pig 
comes years after the first awakening experience: his unexpected 
























the news of Johannes’s death, “Fidelis saw her [Eva], for one 
moment, in the state of a naked being accepting pain” (4). 
In traumatic conditions, the veneer of socially constructed 
difference between humans and animals evaporates; the human, 
reduced to biology, is revealed as constituted by the animal Other 
we are encouraged to renounce in the process of self-constitution. 
Deadened by the terrifying news, Eva Kalb—‘Kalb’ being the Ger-
man word for ‘calf’—is like an animal brought to the slaughter; she 
is zoe, a naked being, an animal stunted before being killed.9 Having 
“slumped toward him [Fidelis], hands clasped, face calm” (4), she 
anticipates the long line of farm animals (with whom she shares 
her maiden name) brought to Fidelis every week for slaughter. 
And the butcher will be there every week “to carry out death’s 
chores” (378), like he was there for the Kalb in Eva’s maiden name, 
which had to be killed into Waldvogel. Having symbolically sur-
rendered to modern masculinity, Eva becomes a “proper” woman: 
a mother (Eve is the biblical name of the mother of humankind), 
wife, and her husband’s accomplice in the war against animals. 
Curiously, the abjected animality is still preserved in her married 
surname. “Forestbird,” as Americans pointed out to the butcher, 
“was an oddly gentle name for one whose profession was based 
in slaughter” (8). 
In the trenches of war Fidelis had a premonition of the underlying 
similarity, even kinship between humans and animals. But at that 
point in life he was a bundle of instincts and unable to understand 
this. Later in life, he will be too bent on proving his manly worth 
and ‘making it’ in the American melting pot to allow himself the lux-
ury of philosophical deliberations. An awareness of the underlying 
identity between himself and the animals he has been slaughter-
ing most of his life will finally resurface at the hour of his death: 
“He was on his hands and knees, kneeling there on the floor like 
an animal. This was the way the animals suddenly collapsed, but, 
he thought, wearily, this is an arrival gate, not a killing chute” 
(378). Returning to the USA, this modern man who till the very 
9. It would be interesting to apply the feminist lens, or, even more intrigu-
ingly, Carol Adam’s theory of the sexual politics of meat, to Eva’s symbolic 
death in the arms of her husband-to-be. Tempting as it may be, this exercise 























end “would not accept the news that he was ill,” who “ignored 
his body, despised its needs, kept his old habits as though they 
would bring back his power” (377), collapses to the floor. Now 
the butcher looks at the world from the vantage point of an animal 
he would routinely slaughter, wondering “[w]ho was there to do 
the same for him?” (378). 
by way of a conclusion
David Nibert’s concept of domesacration, foregrounding the vio-
lence of enslaving animals for human profit, captures the founding 
moment of species war. As “spoils of war,” domesacrated animals 
become objects devoid of the agency they used to enjoy in tradi-
tional, pre-colonial worldviews. The institution of animal slavery 
breaks with the early form of communal multispecies society 
based on kinship (Serpell; Nibert). 
Step-And-A-Half’s ancestors, the  indigenous peoples 
of the Northeastern Woodlands, were nomadic hunters and gath-
erers who treated animals as their equals. The notion of human 
sovereignty was and still is inimical to traditional worldviews that 
go back to Paleolithic times. On the other hand, the driving idea 
of modernity, the worldview imported by European colonizers, 
was connected to human exceptionality and the supposedly divine 
mandate to ‘subdue the earth.’ Rather than asking an animal’s 
permission to give its flesh as food for needy humans and then 
offering thanks for the gift of animal life—as the indigenous 
nomads would do—settlers showed no respect for native ani-
mals’ life and they slaughtered livestock by the thousands. While 
the indigenous inhabitants of the Dakotas had lived in harmony 
and mutuality with the land and everything on it, the European 
newcomers brought a maimed idea of community, from which 
all were excluded save for Westernized humans. 
For scholars drawing inspiration from traditional and indig-
enous worldviews, the idea of human dominionism is the essence 
of colonization. Amba J. Sepie from the University of Canterbury, 
Christchurch, argues: “we have been collectively colonized, over 
a very long time, out of this integrated and intuitive relationship 
with other humans, other species, and the world around us” (10). 
























relationships” (Dwayne Donald, qtd. in Sepie 10), Sepie warns 
against a shallow, ethnographic framing of the process of epistemic 
decolonization. “The objective of decolonization, as a global project,” 
she writes, “is to reassess our collective, diverse, cosmological 
assumptions with respect to all our relationships, in a manner 
that allows for the reconfiguring of the dominant perceptions 
of humanity, and recalibrates human relations with otherness 
of all kinds” (25). 
Native American Viola Cordova explains that most indigenous 
peoples believe they are “part of the Earth” (How It Is 151) and that 
those who separate themselves from the never-ending web of kin-
ship with all existence are not really humans but “ghostly beings 
residing in decadent bodies on inanimate and alien ground” (How 
It Is 213). To be fully human, therefore, we need to be in a rela-
tionship with the nonhuman Other, to treat animals and other 
earth beings as a Thou. For us, dwellers in late modernity, this 
implies liberating ourselves from the unexamined assumptions 
and presumptions we live by. Thinking differently is the first step 
towards living differently. 
I want to close this article by quoting the words of a long-time 
advocate for animal and nature rights, the Chickasaw writer 
and activist Linda Hogan. It is fitting that the last words should 
belong to indigenous people themselves. In her upcoming book, 
The Radiant Lives with Animals, Hogan writes: 
A word for animal Nan okcha means all alive. It means more than only 
that which is animated. Embedded in the language, it says that the ani-
mals have lives and being and are sentient, as is now known and related 
by Western science. Animals, like plants are a significant part of a whole. 
They have relationship and connection with other lives and an animate 
world that is the world at large. In the traditional world view, we have 
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